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SELECTING MEDIATORS AND
REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL DISPUTES1
By: Harold Abramson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Even an adept negotiator can be baffled by cultural differ-
ences.2 When a negotiation reaches an impasse because of an unfa-
miliar cultural interest or a miscommunication between the parties
due to different styles of communicating, negotiating, or decision-
making, the negotiator might find it helpful to enlist assistance
from a culturally-trained and culturally-appropriate mediator. This
Article considers how such a third party can help you, as a negotia-
tor, bridge cultural differences. It considers when to seek aid from
a mediator, what the credentials of the mediator ought to be, and
the impact of the mediator’s approach on the way you represent
your client.
II. WHEN TO ENLIST A MEDIATOR?
In a cross-cultural negotiation, a party may need a process that
can address cultural differences. Parties brought up in dissimilar
cultures might require a process that helps them recognize and
bridge their different upbringings. They may need a process with a
mediator who can help them overcome such cultural gaps as when
an Asian or South American party may be more interested in the
1 This article is based on the author’s chapter, “The Culturally Suitable Mediator” in THE
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK. Schneider and Honeyman , eds., (2006).
* Harold Abramson, Professor of Law at Touro College School of Law, has taught dispute
resolution courses at Cardozo since 2000 and has published extensively in the areas of mediation
representation and international mediation. Professor Abramson’s domestic and international
practice includes mediating, facilitating, and arbitrating business, organizational, and public pol-
icy disputes. He has mediated intellectual property disputes as well as disputes involving employ-
ment, service, licensing, purchase, distribution, and international business contracts. His
international mediations have involved parties from Belgium, China, Columbia, Egypt, Guinea,
India, Israel, Hong Kong, Russia, South Korea, and Venezuela.
2 These differences can arise in disputes between parties from different countries as well as
between parties within the same country when the parties come from different regions or from
different religious, ethnic, or professional groups.
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relationship than the U.S. party who may be more interested in a
detailed contract, or when the U.S. party wants extensive discovery
while the civil law party sees no need for it. They also may benefit
from a mediator who deeply involves the parties, the ones with the
greatest knowledge of the dispute, when the negotiation seems to
be failing because the cultural practice of one side replaces the
principal with her lawyer. By turning to mediation, parties can cre-
ate a forum in which barriers that parties may not be able to over-
come on their own can be addressed.
I recently observed how attorneys can perceptively engage in
cross-cultural analysis when they enlisted assistance from me as a
mediator in a pre-mediation conference. The attorneys informed
me that they thought negotiations had failed so far not because
they were not on the same page, but because one of the parties
from a small Western African country could not negotiate with
someone whom he thought had acted so unethically. The party said
that where he is from, you do not deal with someone like the other
party. He would rather take a chance in court and lose, a signifi-
cant risk according to his own attorney,  than settle with someone
who acted so unethically. The attorneys indicated that they needed
a mediator that could help the parties overcome this impasse.
III. WHAT CREDENTIALS SHOULD THE MEDIATOR POSSESS?
When dealing with cross-cultural disputes, you need a media-
tor whose training and experience goes beyond the familiar basic
credentials. The standard checklist should be expanded to include
two additional questions that are culturally-related: is the mediator
trained to deal with cultural differences? And a second less obvi-
ous question, does the mediator approach mediation in a way that
fits the cultural needs of the parties? The next sections consider
these two questions.
A. Is the Mediator Trained to Deal With Cultural Differences?
A mediator should be trained and experienced in helping par-
ties recognize culturally-shaped interests and overcome culturally-
based impasses.
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i. Culturally-Shaped Interests
The primary purpose in a negotiation, like in any dispute reso-
lution process, is to advance and meet your client’s interests,
whatever they might be. Some commentators have critiqued such
an interests inquiry as a narrow cultural one, shaped by western
cultural individualism. This simplistic view fails to take into ac-
count other culturally-driven goals such as interdependence and re-
latedness.3 A broader view of parties’ interests, however, can
better capture the full range of a client’s cultural needs, framing
each party’s cultural upbringing the content of his or her interests.
Spotting cultural interests can be difficult to do because they
can be buried when positions are presented. A dispute that appears
to be primarily about money, for instance, might be mostly about
protecting a principle, saving face, preserving relationships, or pro-
moting particular community norms and collectivist interests. Al-
though these interests are not unfamiliar in the U.S. culture, these
interests can be deeply compelling ones for parties from some non-
U.S. cultures.4
In collectivist societies, such as in China and Japan, parties can
have an interest in preserving face, an ingrained personal value
that involves being treated with respect and dignity, maintaining
positive relationships, and preserving an honorable reputation and
social standing in the community. “Face-saving” according to
Fisher and Ury, however, “carries a derogatory flavor [in the En-
glish language]. People say, ‘We are doing that just to let them save
face,’ implying that a little pretense has been created to allow
someone to go along without feeling badly. The tone implies ridi-
cule. . .. This is a grave misunderstanding of the role and impor-
tance of face-saving. Face-saving reflects a person’s need to
reconcile the stand he takes in a negotiation or an agreement with
his principles and with his past words and deeds.”5
Parties also can have an interest in a solution appropriate for
the community. In a study of mediation in an Islamic country, the
author found:
3 Compare Amr Abdalla, Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search
Within Islam and Western Literature, 15 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELATIONS 151, 161-62, 165,
176 (2000-2001); ROGER FISHER, ET ALL, GETTING TO YES 41, 48 (2d ed., 1991).
4 See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE
DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL
BOUNDARIES 8-9 (2001). See also FISHER, ET AL., supra note 4.
5 See FISHER, ET AL., supra note 4.
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The settlement must be an appropriate outcome for the commu-
nity as a whole as well as for the actual disputants. The group’s
interests guide the process. This is consistent with collectivist
culture generally where communal and societal interests will
preside over individual party interests. It enables this form of
mediation to serve an educative role by articulating the social
norms and providing acceptable behaviours and solutions for
the disputants and for the community as a whole. In this way it
differs from western mediations where confidentiality and pri-
vacy constraints, for the benefit of the individuals involved, limit
a wider instructive role.6
Finally, consider this international mediation where a cultur-
ally shaped interest was not being met.7 In a dispute between two
businessmen from Latin America and a U.S.-based multinational
company, the lawyer from the U.S. company could not fathom why
the Latin American businessmen wanted an apology from the U.S
company for its apparent negligence in losing a valuable commod-
ity. It was not until the U.S. lawyers realized that the two business-
men had spent on legal fees and travel almost as much money as
they were seeking in court that the U.S. lawyer understood that an
interest other than money needed to be met.
When these sorts of culturally shaped interests might arise in a
dispute, you may want to select a culturally-trained mediator who
can assist parties in recognizing these less familiar and yet essential
needs.
ii. Culturally-Shaped Impasses
Disputing parties can encounter impediments due to their dif-
ferent cultural upbringings that can foster conflicting wants and ap-
proaches to the negotiation. Any study of culture reveals numerous
examples of behavior common in one culture that could be misin-
terpreted by someone brought up in another culture. These misun-
derstandings of behavior may result in or produce an impasse.
When these cultural differences result in an impasse in a negotia-
tion, you might turn to a culturally-trained mediator to help gener-
ate movement.
An appropriately trained mediator can help you recognize and
overcome culturally-based impasses. The mediator can help you
6 See Black, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Brunei Darussalam: the Blending of Im-
ported and Traditional Processes, 13 Bond LR at p. 26 (Dec. 2001) or http://www.bond.edu.au/
law/blr/vol13-2/black.doc
7 This dispute was mediated by the author.
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classify an impasse as well as develop a suitable intervention. The
mediator might use the following five steps.8
During the first three steps, the mediator prepares for the
cross-cultural negotiation by mastering a cultural conceptual
framework, learning about her own cultural upbringing, and inves-
tigating the culture of the other negotiators. The next two steps
provide a guide for the mediator as the mediation progresses. The
mediator approaches the negotiating behavior of others with an
open mind and then helps parties bridge any differences.
These five steps can be illustrated through the use of a hypo-
thetical. Consider how a U.S. attorney might react when he learns
that the other party, an institutional client from Japan, will not be
represented by someone with substantial settlement authority. In-
stead, the other side will be represented by a team of negotiators
who will make decisions by consensus. Furthermore, all the team
members cannot be present in the negotiation session. Under these
circumstances, the U.S. attorney is likely to suspect that the other
side is acting in bad faith. The other side appears to be replacing
the person with real settlement authority with an un-wieldy team
of negotiators. How might the mediator proceed?
First, the mediator comes to the mediation with a conceptual
framework that can help her identify and understand cultural char-
acteristics. The mediator must be able to grasp the meaning of
“cultural behavior” and how it is different from universal “human
behavior.” Cultural characteristics have been isolated in numerous
studies of culture, including studies relevant to conflict resolution.9
The hypothetical implicates a cultural characteristic related to
the process of decision-making for each side. This generic charac-
teristic, like virtually all cultural characteristics, encompasses a
continuum bound at each end with a value-based pole. At one ex-
treme, societies can be found that are hierarchical, with decisions
made by leaders. At the other extreme, societies can be found that
are collective, with decisions made by consensus. The actual cul-
tural practice is rarely one extreme or the other; it usually falls
somewhere between these two end poles of the continuum. Sec-
8 Harold Abramson, International Dispute Resolution: Cross-Cultural Dimensions and
Structuring Appropriate Processes, in ALAN RAU, ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION 918-21 (3d ed., 2002).
9 See, e.g., GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES (abridged 1980, 1984);
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND
(1997); DEAN ALLEN FOS-TER, BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: HOW TO NEGO-
TIATE BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD 264-72 (1992, 1995)
(showing how Hofstede’s work relates to international negotiations).
\\server05\productn\C\CAC\7-2\CAC205.txt unknown Seq: 6  2-AUG-07 14:35
258 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 7:253
ond, the mediator fills in this conceptual framework with a deep
understanding of her own culture or cultures.10 A skilled mediator
must be cognizant of the degree to which her own behavior is uni-
versal or culturally determined, because it is through this personal
lens that the mediator observes and assesses the negotiating behav-
ior of others. To reduce distortions, the mediator must learn about
her own cultural upbringing in order to appreciate the extent to
which her view of other people’s behavior may not necessarily re-
flect a universal view. In the hypothetical, a U.S. mediator should
be aware that her possible view that organizations tend to be hier-
archical, where decision-making is centralized in “leaders,” is not
universal organizational behavior. Third, the mediator strengthens
her conceptual framework with an understanding of the culture or
cultures of the negotiator(s). The mediator should try to identify
and research the culture(s) of the clients as well as the attorneys
that will be participating in the mediation. In doing so, the media-
tor should not assume that just because a person was brought up in
a clearly identifiable culture, the person will act in accordance with
its cultural norms. Furthermore, the mediator should learn as much
as possible about the negotiators as individuals, that is, learn about
their personalities and ways their negotiating behavior may vary
from practices of their culture(s). In the hypothetical, the research
might reveal that one side is from a society in which organizations
typically make decisions based on consensus, but the research may
reveal little about their individual personalities.11
These first three preparatory steps are relatively easy to com-
plete because they entail collecting mostly accessible information
on cultural characteristics. The next two steps, however, are much
more difficult to accomplish because they require the mediator to
suspend judgment and develop strategies during an intense, dy-
namic and fast moving mediation session.
Fourth, the mediator withholds judgments about the parties’
negotiating behavior by viewing key behavior with an open mind.
This mental process requires considerable discipline. It is too easy
for a person who routinely judges negotiating behavior to prema-
turely judge it in a cross-cultural negotiation. In the hypothetical,
10 For studies of American culture, see, e.g., GARY ALTHEN, AMERICAN WAYS xiii, 4,
8, 9-10, 14, 17, 24-25, 136-37 (1998); EDWARD C. STEWART & MILTON J. BENNETT,
AMERICAN CULTURAL PATTERNS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1991).
11 See Loretta Kelly’s description of an Aboriginal Australian representative whose behavior
was sharply at variance with those he supposedly represented. Loretta Kelly, Indigenous Exper-
iences in Negotiation, Ch. 35 THE NEGOTIATOR;S FIELDBOOK. Schneider and Honeyman. (2006).
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the mediator should not view one side’s collective decision-making
process as evidence of good or bad faith; instead she should view
this key negotiating behavior as a difference that needs to be
addressed.
Fifth and finally, the mediator searches for ways to bridge any
resulting gap by helping the parties identify the nature of the im-
passe and by facilitating an intervention. The mediator might facili-
tate an interest-based negotiation, a compromise, or a decision to
defer to one side’s practice. In the process of doing so, the parties
are likely to learn whether the gap reflects a cultural difference
that can be bridged or a strategic ploy (which also could be cul-
tural) that may impede or derail the negotiation.
In the hypothetical, the parties appear to have different views
of who must be present in the mediation session. The U.S. party
expects the other side to bring a single person with settlement au-
thority, and the other side expects multiple people to sign off and
they all cannot be present.
The mediator could facilitate a negotiated solution by resort-
ing to an interest-based approach, where the interests behind the
different practices are explicated and respected. In the hypotheti-
cal, instead of viewing the Japanese party’s claim that it cannot
agree to anything without a consensus as bad faith, the mediator
might focus on how to respect the Japanese party’s need for con-
sensus while still meeting the U.S. party’s need for the presence of
clients with substantial settlement authority. The parties, for exam-
ple, could negotiate an arrangement in which the Japanese party
brings to the negotiation session all the people who must concur, or
at least makes sure the absent people are available by telephone.
Then, in the session, the Japanese consensus approach could be
respected by giving members of its negotiating team ample time to
meet privately.
This calibrated approach can smoke out whether the gap is
based on a bridgeable cultural difference or a strategic ploy. It
might reveal, for instance, an ingrained strategic practice such as
haggling that includes a last minute demand by a senior person that
is purposely not at the table.
Sometimes, a gap might be bridged by one side simply defer-
ring to the other side’s practice, especially when the other practice
is not a deal-breaker or does not implicate core personal values.
For instance, a U.S. attorney may defer to the other side’s formal
practices of carefully using titles and avoiding personal questions
about family.
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In another example, consider how a mediator might handle an
impasse that can arise when a U.S. lawyer insists that signed busi-
ness agreements cover many details and contingencies and the Jap-
anese lawyer displays little interest in reducing details to writing.
The U.S. lawyer will likely interpret this disinterest as reluctance
about the deal or a specific issue. In preparing for a cross-cultural
mediation, a U.S. mediator will realize that his own preference for
reducing everything to writing may be due to his own cultural up-
bringing and may not be a universal mode of behavior (step 2). The
drafting of comprehensive contracts is taught in U.S. law schools
and reinforced in law practice. A Japanese lawyer may have been
brought up differently (step 3). Instead of being concerned about
the details of a written agreement, the Japanese lawyer may be
more concerned about the business relationship, leaving for the
written contract a general statement about the relationship and ba-
sic principles for governing the business deal.
In the negotiations, the mediator would view the reluctance of
the Japanese lawyer to put everything in writing as ambiguous be-
havior to be viewed with an open mind (step 4). These different
approaches might be investigated by the mediator asking why the
U.S. attorney prefers detailed contracts and why the Japanese at-
torney may not. As each side learns more about the other side’s
practice, the mediator can focus on ways to bridge this gap. The
two sides may close the gap by respecting the reasons for the dif-
ferent practices. They may negotiate a compromise in which both
sides seek to cultivate a relationship of trust and then enter into a
contract that may cover key obligations but not every conceivable
contingency (step 5).
B. Does the Mediator’s Approach Fit the
Cultural Needs of the Parties?12
Asking whether a mediator’s approach fits the cultural needs
of the parties can be an unfamiliar but necessary inquiry in order to
formulate an effective cross-cultural process. You may want to in-
quire what sort of third party assistance the parties and the other
attorney are accustomed to as this can influence the sort of media-
tor that they will respond to. This familiar problem-solving ap-
12  Substantial portions of this section are excerpted and edited from NOLAN-HALEY,
ABRAMSON, & CHEW, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CONSENSUAL
ADR PROCESSES 123-37 (2005).
\\server05\productn\C\CAC\7-2\CAC205.txt unknown Seq: 9  2-AUG-07 14:35
2006] CROSS-CULTURAL DISPUTES 261
proach may run counter to their experiences, and a result, not be
readily acceptable. You may need to select a mediator whose ap-
proach comports with the other participants’ cultural upbringings
in order to create an efficacious process.
This mediator selection method, in which cultural preferences
drive the choices, is different from the method I have suggested for
selecting U.S. mediators in a non-cross-cultural context.13 In that
context, parties should select a mediator that will use an approach
that will meet the parties’ needs for resolving the dispute. It is a
choice driven by an analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of
various mediator approaches in view of the parties’ needs, includ-
ing possible cultural considerations.
The culturally-driven selection method suggested here, how-
ever, may be only a intermediary method during this transitional
period toward globalization of mediation practices. I recently saw
evidence of the changes taking place when participating in a U.S.-
Chinese Retreat of dispute resolvers hosted by the CPR Institute.14
One of the Chinese participants noted that when Chinese compa-
nies negotiate with each other and use a mediator, they prefer a
more directive approach to mediation (the common Chinese prac-
tice), however, when Chinese companies use a mediator with non-
Chinese businesses, (i.e. international disputes), they use a facilita-
tive approach (a new mediation approach in China). As the prac-
tices across the globe expand to encompass a broader range of
mediator approaches, the emphasis in the mediator selection dis-
cussion is likely to shift away from cultural analysis and toward
analysis of the various approaches.
Before suggesting a culturally nuanced way to classify media-
tor approaches, the term “mediation” needs some clarification and
definition. There has been much debate over what processes can be
legitimately called mediation. It seems to me that it is just too late
to convincingly defend a favored, circumscribed mediation defini-
tion. I prefer a broad, generic definition that has the flexibility of
accommodating the diversity of approaches to third party assis-
tance found around the globe: Mediation is simply a negotiation
conducted with the assistance of a third party. Instead of focusing
on the noun of mediation, I prefer focusing on the adjective in
13 See HAROLD ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING IN
A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 133-45 (2004).
14 The CPR Institute (International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution) con-
ducted this invitation-only one-and-half day retreat at the Mohonk Mountain House in October,
2005.
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front of the noun. Is the mediation facilitative, evaluative, direc-
tive, transformative, some mix, or something else? Various adjec-
tives are highlighted in the classification system in this article.
i. U.S. Problem-Solving and Self-Determination Approach
U.S. practices reflect a culturally shaped view of mediation, a
view that is vividly conveyed in the highly regarded original Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators.15 Its definition of mediation,
found in the Preface, reveals much about the problem solving role
envisioned in the United States.
Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party—a me-
diator—facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting vol-
untary agreement (or “self determination”) by the parties to the
dispute. A Mediator facilitates communications, promotes under-
standing, focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative
problem solving to enable the parties to reach their own agree-
ment. These standards give meaning to this definition of media-
tion. [Italics added].16
This definition, however, has been modified in the recent
changes to the Model Standards to reflect a momentous broaden-
ing of the term mediation to encompass different “styles.” The re-
vised definition provides that: “Mediation is a process in which an
impartial third party facilitates communication and negotiation and
promotes voluntary decision making by the parties to the dis-
pute.”17 According to the Reporter’s Notes18 “It [the new defini-
tion of mediation] is not designed to exclude any mediation style or
approach consistent with Standard I’s commitment to support and
respect the parties’ decision-making roles in the process.” [Italics
added].19 Therefore, this ostensibly broader definition has a firm
limit. It only welcomes those styles of mediation that comport with
the Westernized fundamental principle of party self-determination.
15 The Model Standards were prepared and approved by three leading organizations in the
United States dispute resolution field:  American Arbitration Association, the Litigation and
Dispute Resolution Sections of the American Bar Association, and the Society of Professionals
in Dispute Resolution (1992-1994). For a discussion of the Model Standards by the chair of the
drafting committee, see Feerick, “Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators” 38 S.
Tex. L.R. 455 (1997).  A comprehensive review and revision of the Model Standards was adopted
by the three sponsoring organizations in 2005. See http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/ (last
visited Aug. 2006).
16 Id. 
17 Id, at Preamble (Sept. 2005).
18 Id at 7.in Reporter’s Notes (Apt. 10, 2005).
19 Id. 
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This fundamental policy of party self-determination reflects a
distinctively U.S. cultural value that is not given the same sacred
regard in more directive practices found in some other areas of the
globe, as described below under evaluatively directive and wisely
directive mediations.
Although the Model Standards’ particular vision of the media-
tor’s role reflect the dominate approach to training mediators in
the United States and a widely practiced approach, it is not the
exclusive one used. No culture can claim a single, monolithic medi-
ation approach, and the United States is no exception. Two other
widely used approaches are transformative and evaluative
mediation.
ii. Transformative Mediation
A transformative mediator engages in a mediation practice
based on communication and relational theory. Instead of pro-
moting the goal of settlement for the parties, the transformative
mediator allows the parties to determine their own direction and
supports the parties’ own opportunities for perspective-taking,
de-liberation, and decision-making. The mediator focuses on the
parties’ interactions and supports their shifts from destructive
and alienating interactions to more constructive and open inter-
actions (referred to as empowerment and recognition shifts). In
this model, parties are likely to be able to make positive changes
in their interactions with each other and, consequently, find ac-
ceptable resolution for themselves, where such terms genuinely
exist.20
iii. Evaluative Mediation
Mediation becomes evaluative when the mediator gives rec-
ommendations such as offering his or her views of the strengths
and weaknesses of the legal case, assessing the reasonableness of
particular settlement options, or proposing what might be a reason-
able settlement. Mediator power to give recommendations can be
found domestically in the recently adopted AAA International
20 See ABRAMSON, supra note 9, at 71-72; also see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNI-TION (1994). For an extensive resource list,
see INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION, INC. at http://
www.transformativemediation.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
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Dispute Resolution Procedures,21  in foreign domestic laws such as
the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996,22  and in the
United Nation’s new Model Law on International Commercial
Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law.23
The adjective evaluative only refers to the power to offer an
evaluation, not the power to persuade or pressure the parties to
accept the evaluation. However, the mere expression of an evalua-
tion can influence parties, that is assert a mildly directive influence,
without the mediator doing anything more than offering the evalu-
ation. Thus, an evaluation is inherently directive and therefore
risks diluting the principle of party self-determination. When the
mediator goes the next step and assertively persuades and pres-
sures, the mediation moves pass mere evaluation toward more di-
rective forms of mediation.
iv. Evaluatively Directive Mediation
When the mediator evaluates and then pushes his or her eval-
uation, the mediator shifts toward an evaluatively directive form of
mediation, an approach that poses a clear threat to party self-deter-
mination. This form of mediation is practiced in the U.S. when
mediators implement their evaluative power by either gently en-
couraging or by assertively pressing parties to move toward or
adopt their evaluations.
In Continental Europe, the mediator’s expected, if not pre-
ferred, role can be influenced by his or her civil law upbringing. In
a study that compares mediation practices in Australia, a common
law jurisdiction, with Germany, a civil law jurisdiction, Nadja Alex-
ander noted that in Germany: “Like the government legal centres
offering conciliation services, most of the dispute resolution
processes associated with these conciliation centres [chambers of
commerce] do not follow an interest-based mediation model.
21 See Rule M-10 Authority of the Mediator, American Arbitration Association, Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution Procedures (Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules), Amended
and Effective July 1, 2003.
22 The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, Article 67(4), adopted verbatim the
Article 7(4) of the UNCITRAL 1980 Conciliation Rules.
23 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 57/18 Model Law on International Com-
mercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Article
6(4), (Jan. 24, 2003). The UNCITRAL Model Law incorporated the power to make proposals
for settlement found in the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, Article 7 (4) (Report of the UNCI-
TRAL on the Work of it’s Thirteenth Session, GAOR, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement, No. 17,
UN Document No. A/35/17 (1980)).
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Rather, the processes offered tend to be directive, interventionist
and rights-based in nature.”24
There are many mediators within the U.S. and around the
globe that are known to be evaluatively directive, although the par-
ticular practices can vary across a continuum of less to more direc-
tive. The more directive a practice becomes, the greater the threat
to party self-determination.
v. Wisely Directive and Authoritatively Directive Mediations
In some cultures, disputing parties are accustomed to relying
on a “wise” third party as a source of the “right” answers who will
assertively if not aggressively direct them toward a solution. A
wisely directive mediator investigates the dispute, evaluates it, and
formulates and promotes solutions based on the wisdom for which
he or she was selected. That wisdom could be informed by local
cultural norms, religious values, or the mediator’s age, legal knowl-
edge, or leadership or authoritative position. Parties expect to re-
ceive answers and are receptive to, if not desirous of, adopting
them. There seems to be little regard to protecting party self-deter-
mination. Therefore, while the role of the wise third party may be
to “mediate,” the third party effectively functions as a quasi-adju-
dicator imposing a resolution on the parties. Wisely directive
mediators can be found in some Islamic, Islamic/Arabic, and Chi-
nese cultures, among other places.25
In Lebanese cultures, George Irani, noted that:
24 See Nadja Alexander, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Mapping Modern Mediation Move-
ments in Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions, 13 BOND LAW REVIEW 16, 23 (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/vol13-2/Alexander.doc (last visited Aug. 2006).
25 See George Irani, Islamic Medication Techniques for Middle East Conflicts, 3 MIDDLE
EASTERN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (June 1999); John Murray, The
Cairo Stories: Some Reflections on Conflict Resolution in Egypt, 13 NEGOTIATION JOUR-
NAL 39, 53-54 (1997); Ann Black, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Brunei Darussalam: The
Blending of Imported and Traditional Processes, 13 BOND LAW REVIEW 16, 26 (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/vol13-2/black.doc; SALAH AL-HEJAILAN, ME-
DIATION AS A MEANS FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT DISPUTES IN ARAB COUN-
TRIES, presented to WIPO Conference on Mediation, Geneva, Switzerland (Mar. 29, 1996),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/hejailan.html; Eric Glassman, The
Function of Mediation in China: Examining the Impact of Regulations Governing the People’s
Mediation Committees, 10 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL 460 (1992); Michael T.
Colatrella, Jr., Court-Performed Mediation in the People’s Republic of China: A Proposed Model
to Improve the United States District Courts’ mediation Programs, 15 OHIO STATE JOURNAL
ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 391, 404-08 (2000); Robert Perkovich, A Comparative Analysis
of Community Mediation in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 10 TEMPLE
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 313 (1996).
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. . .as in Arab culture in general, the mediator is perceived as
someone having all the answers and solutions. He therefore has
a great deal of power and responsibility. As one participant put
it: ‘If [the third party] does not provide the answers, he or she is
not really respected or considered to be legitimate.26
In Egypt, John Murray observed the assertive role of third
parties in his study of three public disputes and his own exper-
iences living and teaching in Cairo:
***[I]t is acceptable, indeed expected, that the third party will
also apply pressure to help bring about agreement. This is why
the resources and status of the third party are so valuable.
Third-party pressure is welcomed even by those who feel its
sting. . ..27
In a study of traditional rural mediation in Brunei Darus-
salam, a country with a strong Islamic influence, Ann Black docu-
mented these mediator credentials and behavior:
Equally important is for the mediator to have good knowledge
of the rules to apply and to employ these to determine what is
the right or fair outcome, and then to direct and guide the par-
ties towards a similar solution. An ability to persuade, even to
coerce parties by moral imperatives, to a settlement, is an
attribute.28
In the chart below, Ms. Black highlighted differences between
traditional mediation in a collectivist society of the sort she studied
in Borneo and the western form of mediation found in individualis-
tic societies.29
She also observed how this traditional mediator’s role, in
which the wise third party promotes particular outcomes, can di-
minish when people leave the intimacy of their villages that are
bound by social and kinship ties for more anonymous living in ur-
ban areas.
Although most of the mediation case studies that illustrate the
work of a wisely directive mediator have been in community dis-
putes, the practice also has been described in the mediation of
26 See George Irani, “Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts” 3 Mid. E.
Rev. of Intl Aff. 4 (June 1999).
27 See Murray, “The Cairo Stories: Some Reflections on Conflict Resolution in Egypt” Neg.
J. 39, 53-54 (January 1997).
28 See, Black, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Brunei Darussalam: the Blending of Im-
ported and Traditional Processes, 13 Bond LR at p. 26 (Dec. 2001) or http://www.bond.edu.au/
law/blr/vol13-2/black.doc (last visited Aug. 2006).
29 See, Id. at 21.
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Table 1  Comparison of Features of Western and
Traditional Mediation
Western/Independent Mediation Traditional/Iban Mediation
[individualist culture] [collectivist culture]
 Goal of mediation is for  Goal of mediation is to end
parties to reach an agreement the dispute between parties so
that ends the dispute to their that harmony can return to the
mutual satisfaction. longhouse community.
 ***  ***
 Mediators should not have  Mediators are connected to
social ties, or be related to, the the disputants through social
disputants. relationships or kinship ties.
 Accreditation has objective  Accreditation has subjective
basis - such as courses, basis - trust and respect of that
professional qualifications, community. There is no training,
recognition by authoritative other than community
bodies. enculturation.
 ***  ***
 Mediations occur in private  Mediations typically occur in a
settings - an office/ room neutral public setting - raui of the
for the parties. longhouse.
 ***.  ***
 Mediators should be impartial,  Mediators should be fair, kind,
objective and even-handed. loving and subjectively appraise
 Criticism of disputants’ options.
behaviour or character is  Criticism is acceptable where
unacceptable. this is relevant to the dispute.
 Parties direct the outcome -  Moral persuasion and coercion
mediator should not persuade or can be justified in the interests of
coerce. the longhouse community.
commercial disputes. When considering the role of the mediator in
resolving private commercial disputes (such as intellectual property
disputes) in the Arab world, the Chairman of the Higher Board of
Euro-Arab Arbitration System and a lawyer in Saudi Arabia, Salah
Al-Hejailan, gave this wisely directive characterization of the medi-
ator’s role:
The mediator is normally a person of a prestigious social
standing who is known for his thorough knowledge, honesty and
impartiality. Seniority and respect for elders are particularly reso-
nant in the Arab World. Such a person enjoys the respect of the
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disputants who invariably feel satisfied with any award he may deem
appropriate [italics added].30
Even though these historic wisely directive practices have
been confirmed in my recent travels to Turkey and China to discuss
mediation practices as well as in numerous meetings with visiting
Chinese, Egyptian, Japanese, Indian attorneys, and other visiting
foreign attorneys, these discussions also hinted at a transformation
that may be taking place. When discussing the nature of wisely di-
rective practices, the respect for these third parties seem to be di-
minishing although not necessarily the clout. Wisely directive
mediation may be in the process of being supplanted with a form of
mediation that I call “authoritatively directive.” Although these
two sorts of mediators function similarly-as quasi-adjudicators,
their sources of clout are different. While the wise mediator’s
source of influence may be his or her recognized wisdom, the au-
thoritative mediator’s source may be his or her position of official
authority, especially in countries with authoritative governments or
collectivism as a pervasive cultural value.31
vi. Distinguishing Wisely Directive Mediation from
Other Settlement Processes32
The dominant function of the wisely directive mediator is simi-
lar to the function of an evaluative mediator in which the third per-
son assesses the merits of the dispute or solutions, the judge in a
judicial settlement conference in which the third person hints at
what she might do in court or urges a particular settlement, and an
arbitrator in nonbinding arbitration where the third person issues a
decision on the merits. In all these processes, the third party offers
evaluations.
It is important to note that parties’ responses to the evalua-
tions in the U.S. differ from the responses to the wisely directive
evaluation in other countries. An evaluation from a U.S. mediator
can provide valuable input, however, parties are relatively free to
reject the recommendation and resist any pressure if the mediator
is also directive, with little consequence to the parties. An evalua-
tion as well as any pressure from a settlement judge can be riskier
30 See Salah Al-Hejailan, “Mediation as a Means for Amicable Settlement of Disputes in
Arab Countries” presented to WIPO Conference on Mediation, Geneva, Switzerland (March 29,
1996) at http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/hejailan.html (last visited Aug. 2006).
31 The authoritative mediator may be one appointed by the government to serve as a Judge
to settle cases or as a mediator.
32 This section is based on Abramson’s analysis in Nolan-Haley, Abramson, and Chew
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESS 136-137 (2005).
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to repel especially if the parties want to avoid alienating the judge
that might decide the case. Nevertheless, parties are not shy about
resisting pressure when they must to protect their interests-a proud
trait for those brought up in an individualistic society. In addition,
a nonbinding decision from an arbitrator can influence parties
without the parties being pressured by the third party, who will not
be further involved in resolving the dispute.
In contrast, a wise third party’s evaluation and pressure is re-
ceived quite differently in other cultures. Based on history and ex-
perience in a collectivist society as suggested in the various case
studies, disputing parties in other cultures expect the wisely direc-
tive mediator to steer them toward the right solution that they are
then receptive to adopting. Why else would they go to a third party
for help, they would wonder? In short, they expect the third party
to dress like a mediator but act like a wise quasi-arbitrator.
Although wisely directive mediation may no longer be em-
braced intact by either mediators or parties in modern societies, its
influence can still be felt in the mediation preferences of some cul-
tures around the globe, including the possibility of it shaping an
emerging authoritative form of directive mediation.
As should be apparent from these descriptions of wisely direc-
tive or authoritatively directive practices, they offer forms of medi-
ation that seem to give the least regard to preserving party self-
determination.
This section on various adjectives suggests a continuum of cul-
tural influences and practices around the globe. Any generaliza-
tions are risky, especially because no country has a monolithic
approach. Nevertheless, these generalizations, based on likely cul-
tural propensities, can at least sensitize attorneys to the range of
possible adjectives to look for. A tentative continuum might be
constructed with Chinese and Islamic cultures being the most di-
rective, Civil Law cultures less, followed by the U.S. and Australian
cultures, with English practices being the most elicitive along with
transformative mediation in the U.S. It remains to be seen whether
this continuum33 will withstand the ongoing study of global media-
tion practices.
33 Although this analysis concentrates on one prominent feature of mediation, the elicitive-
directive continuum along with the corollary party self-determination continuum, a more
nuanced analysis of the adjectives would consider other culturally distinguishing features. Medi-
ation processes can be further differentiated based on the degree of impartiality of the mediator
and the degree of influence the mediator has over the parties, whether the mediator focuses
primarily on process or on process and content, the importance of confidentiality, and whether
mediator training is required, among other distinguishing features.
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This next section considers how a participant’s preference
point on the elicitive-directive continuum shapes the resulting me-
diation process.
vii. Preferences Grid: Mediation Processes Based
On Coalescing Preferences
As Professor Leonard Riskin has emphasized, it takes two to
create a mediation process. It is not formulated by the mediator
alone or the parties/attorneys alone. Each participant can influence
the shape of the resulting mediation process.34 Rather than focus-
ing on influence here, however, I will consider how the cultural
preference of each participant, when coalesced in the mediation,
produces a distinctive mediation process. Instead of mapping each
participant’s ability to influence the final resulting process, this grid
maps each participant’s preference.
The preferences grid consists of two axes. The horizontal one
maps the mediator’s dominant approach to the mediation. It incor-
porates Riskin’s elicitive-directive continuum, a continuum that re-
flects a range of mediators’ approaches found around the globe.
Mediators can be highly elicitive, facilitative, predominately
facilitative, facilitative-directive, and varying degrees of directive-
ness. Riskin carefully defines directiveness broadly to include eval-
uations and assertive mediator behavior.35
The vertical axis maps the cultural preference of the parties/
attorneys for third party assistance in resolving disputes.36 It fo-
cuses on their preferred relationship with the mediator. The axis
maps a continuum of party/attorney preferences that ranges from
preferring elicitive to directive mediators. You would expect par-
ties/attorneys brought up in an individualistic society to lean to-
ward preferring a more elicitive approach and to be less deferential
to a mediator’s directiveness while a side brought up in a more
34 See Leonard Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1, 37-46 (2003).
35 See id.
36 The vertical axis reflects the parties’/attorneys’ composite preference for a mediator al-
though the preference of each attorney and each client may differ, especially in a cross-cultural
mediation. A separate preference axis could be mapped for each participant. The vertical axis in
the grid reflects the result negotiated by the participants among themselves regarding the sort of
mediator that they want to select. Presumably, it is a result that fits the cultural needs of the
parties.
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collectivist society is more likely to prefer a more directive
mediator.37
A
Problem-Solving
    F
Dysfunctional
   B
Evaluative
   E
Evaluatively
Directive
       C
Wisely Directive
 D
Dysfunctional 
Parties/Attorneys’ Preference
Prefer Elicitive Approach 
Elicitive
Prefer Directive Approach
Mediator’s
Approach
This second axis firmly demonstrates how it takes two to
tango—to create the mediation process. A mediator who is direc-
tive, even aggressively so, for instance, does not necessarily result
in the parties/attorneys being deferential to the mediator’s proce-
dural moves or substantive direction. As the second axis clarifies,
the parties/attorneys must be willing partners—that is, be receptive
to a more directive approach for the resulting process actually to be
directive.
The preferences grid illustrates the importance of the media-
tor and parties/attorneys sharing compatible preferences in order
for the mediation process to function, and shows how these prefer-
ences shape the resulting process. Consider several combinations:
37 But see Christopher Honeyman, et al., Skill is Not Enough: Seeking Connectedness and
Authority in Mediation, 20 NEGOTIATION JOURNAL 489 (2004) (comparing U.S. practices
with community mediations in China and Australia).
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If the mediator is extremely elicitive and the parties/attorneys
prefer an extremely elicitive approach, then the result can be a
classically problem-solving mediation that preserves party self-de-
termination. See point A.
If the mediator is modestly directive and the parties/attorneys
prefer a modestly elicitive approach, the result can be a classically
evaluative mediation where the mediator offers evaluations and
the parties/attorneys give some weight to them. See point B.
If the mediator is extremely directive and the parties/attorneys
prefer an extremely directive approach, the result can be a wisely
directive mediation. See point C.
If the mediator is extremely elicitive and the parties/attorneys
prefer an extremely directive approach, the mediation process may
become dysfunctional. The parties/attorneys are likely to become
quite frustrated because they are not getting the mediation service
that they prefer. See point D.
Within these prototypical results, many gradations may be en-
countered. For example, if the mediator is evaluative and consider-
ably directive and the parties/attorneys prefer a considerably
directive approach, the result is likely to be an evaluatively direc-
tive mediation process. See point E. If the mediator is evaluatively
directive and the parties/attorneys prefer primarily an elicitive ap-
proach, the mediation process also may become dysfunctional be-
cause the parties/attorneys are likely to become frustrated with the
process. See point F.
In the spirit of Riskin’s caveats in his article about his “New
New Grid System,” this grid hopefully promotes understanding
and discussion while avoiding being so complicated that it becomes
confusing and unmanageable.38 The tension between formulating a
nuanced grid and one that is easily accessible is inherent in this
undertaking. I also prefer to err in favor of simplicity in order to
present succinctly the encounter between distinctively cultural ap-
proaches of mediators and the preferences of parties/attorneys.
The resulting grid, however, should not be blindly followed as a
confident predictor of the resulting mediation process. Its value is
in offering a framework for discerning and selecting the type of
mediator who might formulate the sort of mediation process that
may be effective with your client and the other side.
38 See Riskin, supra note 35, at 50-53.
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IV. IMPACT OF MEDIATOR’S APPROACH ON
CLIENT REPRESENTATION
After you select a mediator who is culturally trained and suita-
ble, you need to figure out how to effectively represent your client
before that sort of mediator. Knowing that the mediator is cultur-
ally trained does not radically impact your approach to representa-
tion; it only expands the possibilities of what can be achieved in the
mediation. The mediator can assist you in clarifying any culturally-
related interests of the parties and overcoming any culturally-re-
lated impasses. Selecting a culturally suitable mediator, however,
can singularly shape your entire representation strategy. Your
whole approach to enlisting assistance from the mediator can be
shaped by your understanding of how the mediator will approach
the process; in other words, your approach will be fashioned by the
“adjective.”39
If you select a problem solving mediator (one that will stay in
that mode), you, as the attorney, can advocate as a problem
solver.40 You have the freedom and security to share information
including interests, to brainstorm options, to recognize weaknesses
in your client’s legal case, and to be open to creative solutions that
go beyond the ones in the legal papers. You can feel secure41 ask-
ing the mediator for help—whether to sort out interests, facilitate
evaluating the legal case, or develop multiple options. You also
have much freedom and security with a transformative mediator,
who is trained to support whatever sort of process is structured and
implemented by you, your client, and the other side, although you
cannot rely on the mediator’s expertise or initiatives to create or
direct a process, as the transformative mediator is committed to
being non-directive.
In contrast, consider the impact of selecting an evaluative
(non-directive) mediator on your approach to advocacy. Mediator
evaluations can take a variety of forms, including the mediator as-
39 The following analysis of how the adjective can shape your representation strategy is
taken from Harold Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A Model of Client
Representation, 10 HARVARD NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW 103, 124-28 (2005). Also see
NOLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON & CHEW, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLU-
TION: CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESSES, Ch. 4 (2005).
40 For a full discussion on how to advocate as a problem solver, see ABRAMSON, supra
note 9.
41 But see the section on mediation’s structural biases in Christopher Honeyman, Under-
standing Mediators, Ch. 67 in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK. Scjmeoder and Honeyman, eds.,
(2006).
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sessing the reasonableness of various settlement options, assessing
the consequences of not settling, or recommending settlement pro-
posals either as the mediation unfolds or as a “mediator’s propo-
sal.” Knowing that the mediator may formulate one or more of
these types of evaluations can induce you to approach the media-
tion more like an adjudicatory process than a negotiation. Instead
of formulating a negotiation strategy based on candid conversa-
tions with the mediator and meeting parties’ interests, you are apt
to return to the traditional adversarial approach, so familiar in the
courtroom, in which you withhold unfavorable information, hide
any flexibility to avoid implying a lack of confidence in the legal
case, and present carefully crafted partisan arguments and posi-
tions that are designed to persuade a decision-maker to act
favorably.
Alternatively, you might problem solve, but in a selective way
that reduces the risk of an unfavorable assessment by the mediator.
In such a constricted problem solving approach, you still share and
advocate your client’s interests and engage in problem solving
moves such as brainstorming options and designing creative solu-
tions, but only up to a point. You will avoid sharing information or
showing flexibility that may risk a less favorable evaluation from
the mediator. This carefully calibrated strategic plan can dilute the
potential of a problem solving process by limiting the ability of par-
ties to uncover optimal solutions. Withholding information may
bury valuable data and insights relevant to devising solutions. Hid-
ing flexibility may cramp the opportunity to search for, and devise,
creative solutions. But, in return, you can secure an evaluation that
might spur parties toward settlement.
As a mediator’s approach moves further toward the end of the
directive continuum, your problem solving approach will become
more constricted until it morphs into a traditional adversarial strat-
egy. When the mediator’s approach becomes highly directive, or
wisely directive, you are likely to view the mediator as a decision-
maker and will advocate accordingly.
Finally, this discussion implies that a mediator will stay within
the selected approach throughout the mediation process. But Ris-
kin reminded us that mediation is not a static process. Some, if not
many, mediators purposely vary their roles as the mediation pro-
gresses by facilitating at one point, evaluating at the point that
seems useful, being directive when necessary at another point, and
returning to facilitating when it seems appropriate—a practice that
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they espouse as necessary for resolving disputes.42 Unfortunately,
Riskin omitted assessing the impact of this mediator practice on
how attorneys represent their clients. When the mediator freely
switches roles, you are likely to abandon a nuanced representation
approach and adopt the safest mode of client representation, an
adversarial one, because it is likely to provide the best protection
against an unfavorable evaluation.
V. CONCLUSION
This article suggests when you might want to bring in a media-
tor to help parties resolve a cross-cultural dispute. When you de-
cide to do so, you should consider enlisting a third party who is
both culturally-trained and culturally-suitable for the dispute. Af-
ter selecting the mediator, you need to contemplate how to effec-
tively represent your client in the process. There is no one all-
purpose strategy that will maximize the opportunities before every
sort of mediator. The optimum advocacy approach depends on the
sort of mediator selected.
42 See Riskin, supra note 35, at 13-17, 17-21, 28-29 (noting further how each role can either
foster or impair party self-determination).
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